Two-part tariffs with partial unbundling by Jensen, Sissel
Two-Part Tariﬀs with Partial Unbundling∗
Sissel JENSEN†
Discussion paper 19/2001
Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Administration
October 2001
Abstract
The paper explores second degree price discrimination in a multi-
dimensional good context. There are two types of consumers with demand
described by a two-dimensional vector, a quantity dimension and a service
attribute dimension (mode of usage, usage pattern). The adverse selec-
tion parameter determines the consumers’ willingness to pay for quantity
increments with a certain set of attributes. The multi-dimensionality is
exploited by forcing a restriction on the mode of usage towards consumers
with low willingness to pay in order to make it less tempting for high types
to mimic a low type. We show that the ﬁrm introduces distortions in
the use of the service against a decrease in the quantity distortions in the
low-type’s contract.
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1 Introduction
Consumers are often heterogeneous along numerous dimensions. In telecommuni-
cations, for example, consumers diﬀer with respect to the quantity they purchase
(minutes called) as well as in their calling pattern (whom they call, when they
call, the duration of each call, etc.). With a few notable exceptions, the literature
does not address the question on how a monopoly should price discriminate in
a market with multidimensional heterogeneity.1 The purpose of this paper is to
explore how a monopoly might use two instruments to enhance the proﬁtability
from second degree price discrimination.
When consumers’ willingness to pay is private information and the ﬁrm must
condition the contract upon observable variables, it is most often assumed that
the ﬁrm can observe only one variable. It is also common to assume that the
observed variable is single dimensional, e.g., quality in Mussa and Rosen (1978)
and quantity in Maskin and Riley (1984). Although being welfare improving com-
pared to uniform pricing, the performance of second degree price discrimination
relative to ﬁrst best practice (marginal-cost pricing) depends upon the degree of
the demand side heterogeneity.2 In general therefore, any strategy that increases
the observability of consumers’ willingness to pay will increase proﬁt and welfare.
In the present paper a monopoly ﬁrm sells a single generic good, for instance
minutes of network usage. Each quantity increment can be assigned a unique
list of observable attributes, such as time-of-day, distance, call termination point,
etc, and this describes a consumer’s calling pattern. By monitoring consumers’
calling patterns, the ﬁrm is able to oﬀer a tariﬀ intended for low demand con-
sumers on terms that diﬀer from the terms on which high demand consumers
make their purchases. Such practice can potentially improve “the observabil-
ity” of consumers’ characteristics in terms of self-selection, and thus implies less
distortions towards low demand consumers.
It is possible to translate the multidimensionality implied by diﬀerences in
1Work on multi-dimensional screening includes diﬀerent kinds of problems. One polar case is
when consumers are described by several characteristics but the ﬁrm has only one instrument at
hand, references are Laﬀont, Maskin and Rochet (1987), Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi
and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), and Jullien (2000). The other polar case is when consumers
are described by one characteristic but the ﬁrm can use several instruments, as in Matthews
and Moore (1987) with risk-aversion, or as in Sappington (1983), and Caillaud, Guesnerie,
Rey and Tirole (1988) with several observables and instruments. Rochet and Chone´ (1998),
and Armstrong and Rochet (1999) work within a model with several instruments and several
characteristics, also providing an overview of the literature. Wilson (1993) provides deﬁnitions
and examples of multidimensional goods and multidimensional pricing. Deneckere and McAfee
(1996) and Foros, Jensen and Sand (1999) present models similar to the one presented in this
paper; Deneckere and McAfee with uniform pricing and Foros et al. with nonlinear pricing,
but in both articles the restriction on usage is exogenous.
2The price-cost margin depends on the range of the type-space and on the ﬁrm’s prior beliefs
about the distribution of types over this space. If the heterogeneity on the demand side is large
then a large fraction of consumers pay a price well above marginal cost.
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calling patterns into a multiproduct setting by letting units assigned diﬀerent sets
of attributes be treated as diﬀerent products. If the ﬁrm ignores the heterogeneity
in consumers’ calling patterns but charge all units the according to the same tariﬀ,
it aggregates all taste parameters and practice complete bundling. In the present
context we let the ﬁrm bundle a subset of the products and charge units within
this product bundle according to a diﬀerent tariﬀ. The ﬁrm do not debundle
completely, and hence, we refer to this practice as partial bundling.3
We hold on to the assumption that consumers diﬀer in their marginal will-
ingness to pay for quantity and say that there are two types of consumers, high
demand and low demand consumers. In addition, we assume that consumers
with diﬀerent willingness to pay also have distinctly diﬀerent calling patterns. In
particular, high demand consumers make calls to a large number of subscribers,
whereas low demand consumers make calls to a small number of subscribers.
High-dispersion subscribers can be thought of as business consumers while low
dispersion subscribers can be thought of as residential consumers. The ﬁrm of-
fers a menu of two-part tariﬀs, each specifying a ﬁxed fee that must be paid
up-front, a marginal usage price, and in addition use-of-service restrictions which
consumers must obey. Customers choose their preferred tariﬀ scheme and usage
is subsequently billed according to this choice.
The predominant method of charging consumers for telecom usage has been
to bill for the length of time a connection is used. All multi-dimensionality
in the consumers’ use of the service was translated into a single-dimensional
quantity variable (pulses, and later minutes). The practice of sorting consumers
with diﬀerent willingness to pay for usage was handled by giving high demand
consumers quantity discount, in consistence with single-dimensional screening
models. Today the multi-dimensionality in usage patterns is to an increasing
extent used to achieve separation. Tariﬀ options known as Friends and Family
and Best Friend are examples of discounts given on certain calling patterns. Other
examples are telecom companies that oﬀer discounts on dial-up internet access,
in the form of discounts on standard calling rates or in the form of a monthly
ﬁxed fee for a ﬁxed number of hours of usage, (ﬂat rate dial-up internet access).4
Firms’ use of calling circle tariﬀs has received some attention in other areas in
the economics literature. Wang and Wen (1998) consider a duopoly model with
demand side heterogeneity, where such pricing behavior enables a new ﬁrm to
3In the multiproduct setting it would be the case that although the ﬁrm has imperfect
knowledge about a given consumer’s taste for one product, it knows that it is perfectly correlated
with the taste for any other product. Miravete (2001) study multidimensional screening where
diﬀerent type components distinguish quality dimensions of products that can be aggregated.
The ability to aggregate type components opens the possibility to reduce the dimensionality
of the screening process. Sibley and Srinagesh (1997) explore the diﬀerence between screening
the diﬀerent dimensions of consumer types independently by means of two-part tariﬀs and the
alternative of bundling all taste parameters to design a single two-part tariﬀ.
4Dial-up internet access is in this way singled out as a separate product.
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enter the market despite the presence of consumer switching costs. This result
is derived under speciﬁc assumptions about consumer calling patterns, speciﬁ-
cally that low demand types make calls to other low demand types, whereas high
demand types make calls to other high demand types. By relaxing this assump-
tion one might conclude diﬀerently (see Klemperer (1995) for a survey on the
switching cost literature). Laﬀont, Rey and Tirole (1998) examine the eﬀects
of discriminatory pricing on the negotiated interconnection agreements between
rival network operators. When a network operator charges diﬀerent prices for
calls terminating on the subscriber’s network and those terminating on a rivals
network he can generate network externalities despite network interconnection.
Throughout the paper we shall hold on to a simple example applied to telecom-
munications and assume that consumers with diﬀerent willingness to pay for the
service have distinctly diﬀerent calling patterns. Section 2 describes the generic
features of telecommunications that are relevant for this paper. The aim in Sec-
tion 3 is to give a deﬁnition of the quantity variable that the usage charge in a
two-part tariﬀ applies to. Section 4 presents the demand- and supply side con-
ditions of the market as well as the informational constraints faced by the ﬁrm.
Finally, in section 5 we draw conclusions from the analysis.
2 Telecommunications services
The telecommunications market has experienced rapid changes during the last
decades. A large variety of services are nowadays provided on a common platform
and the technology convergence gives rise to signiﬁcant changes in the demand
side of the market as well. New services at reasonable prices and more multifunc-
tional customer premises equipment, for instance the world wide web, personal
computers, and all applications on the web, have also led to large increases in
the demand for transmission capacity (time length or more bandwidth). Built-in
network intelligence and sophisticated monitoring of usage have enabled ﬁrms
in the market to move from billing customers for single dimensional pulses to
billing multidimensional minutes. The method of pricing a call used to be by a
conversion from hour-of-day, day-of-week, distance, etc, to pulses by tables in the
central oﬃce. The ﬁrm had no information about a consumer’s demand other
than the number of pulses consumed at the end of the billing period. Network
technology and billing systems now price a call minute according to a detailed call
record. Hence, the ﬁrm possesses very detailed information about a consumer’s
usage pattern.
The telecommunications network is a two-way network and a person or a ma-
chine that is present at one speciﬁc node asks for some type of communication
with another speciﬁc node at some given hour, weekday, etc.5 Even though a
5A phone call, an e-mail, a web-site etc with an objective to exchange, deliver or gather
information). In this respect telecommunications is very diﬀerent from other network industries,
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one minute call within a speciﬁc calling area is a perfectly standardized prod-
uct, its point of destination is of vital importance to the consumer who makes
the call. A consumer does not derive any beneﬁt from a call which destines at
a B-subscriber he did not intend to call.6 The same feature also applies to in-
formation services generated at a speciﬁc network node. These are features of
telecommunications that make it a multi-dimensional good. For instance, indi-
vidual call records usually contain information about at what hour the call is
made, who is the B-subscriber, and where the B-subscriber is located (local, long
distance, international). Furthermore, subscribers are typically billed according
to aggregate minutes (seconds) of peak-time long distance calling, oﬀ-peak long
distance calling, peak-time international calling, etc. There are examples of ser-
vice attributes that have an obvious ranking, e.g. if the attributes are diﬀerent
quality levels along a vertical dimension they are ranked the same way by all
customers. However, this is not always the case with telecommunications. For
instance, not all consumers prefer – at an equal price – to make calls at the same
time of day. Service attributes such as the time-of-day or the node where a call
terminates are attributes along a horizontal dimension and customers will rank
them diﬀerently.
A widespread practice is to oﬀer various kinds of calling circle tariﬀs. Under a
calling circle tariﬀ, a subscriber is billed according to aggregate minutes (seconds)
of calling to speciﬁc B-subscribers (or speciﬁc network nodes), and the marginal
price varies conditional on the node of termination. The following model aims at
explaining and guiding the construction of such tariﬀs.
3 A two-dimensional good
Let q be a two-dimensional good q = (n, x), where x is a quantity variable and n
is a service attribute.7 The vector q tells us how many units (x) with the given
service attribute (n) a consumer did buy. When we sum over all possible service
attributes (i.e., over every possible n) the sum is equal to a consumer’s total
demand, i.e., aggregate units of the generic good. This is to collect and sum up
like electricity or water delivery. One kW/h of electricity injected at one point is a perfect
substitute for one kW/h injected at any other point of generation.
6The B-subscriber is the party being called whereas the A-subscriber is the party making
the call.
7A context with multidimensional products is similar to a multiproduct context since units
assigned diﬀerent sets of attributes can be treated as diﬀerent products. The distinction be-
tween a multiproduct context and a multidimensional product context is that the consumer is
allowed to custom design the service attributes by assigning each item his preferred attributes
(termination node/B-subscriber, time of day, day of week etc) instead of choosing between a
ﬁxed and more constrained number of products. See Wilson (1993, part 3) for a description
of multidimensional products and multidimensional pricing and for instance Armstrong (1996)
on multiproduct pricing.
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the x’s at every point in ﬁgure 1(a) (or 1(b)). Figure 1 gives two examples on
representation of q. In the ﬁgure, xa is the number of minutes a high demand
consumer called network node na, and x
′
a is the number of minutes a low demand
consumer called network node n′a. Note that the n-axis merely gives the identity
of the party called (phone numbers) and is not ordered in any sense.
n
x
(na, xa)
(a) High demand consumer
n
x
(n
′
a, x
′
a)
(b) Low demand consumer
Figure 1: Demand bundles. High demand consumers make calls of longer duration
and to a larger number of network subscribers
We represent a consumer’s purchase set Q by sorting along the attribute
dimension, and describe this set with a “continuous boundary” x (n). Using the
telephone example again, and saying that the attribute assignment is network
node (B-subscriber), sorting along the attribute dimension gives a presentation of
the most called number, the second most called number, and so on.8 We introduce
heterogeneity on the demand side by assuming that a consumer’s willingness to
pay for the good is characterized by a privately known parameter θ, measuring
the intensity of a consumer’s valuation of quantity. A consumer θ includes in his
purchase set Q all increments for which his valuation v(q, θ) exceeds the marginal
price p charged
Q (θ; p) = {q : v (q, θ) ≥ p}
= {(n, x) : v ((n, x) , θ) ≥ p} . (1)
The boundary around the set given by (1) is those points where the marginal
8Such a presentation is only possible if the service attributes can be interpreted as cardinal
levels and if n is continuous. The various attributes can not be along dimensions such as for
instance color.
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valuation equals the marginal price. Marginal valuation is given by
v ((n, x) , θ) =
∂2U (.)
∂n∂x
, (2)
v ((n, x) , θ1) ≤ v ((n, x) , θ2) ,when θ1 < θ2.
Type θ gains gross utility from consuming the purchase set Q (θ; p) given by the
double integral
U (Q (θ; p)) =
∫∫
Q
v ((n, x) , θ) dndx. (3)
By saying that the boundary around the set can be represented by a monotonic
function x(n; θ, p), which is continuous and everywhere diﬀerentiable, we can
derive the demand from consumer type θ by solving a single integral over the
attribute dimension. Aggregate demand for the generic good over all possible
attribute levels is given by
Q (p, θ) =
∫ ∞
0
x (s; θ, p) ds, (4)
and we deﬁne Qi(p) ≡ Q(p, θi), i = 1, 2. Aggregate demand for the generic good
with attribute level n¯ or lower, i.e., aggregate calls to the n¯ most called network
nodes, is given by
Q¯ (p, θ, n¯) =
∫ n¯
0
x (s; θ, p) ds, (5)
and similarly we deﬁne Q¯i(p, n¯) ≡ Q(p, θi, n¯), i = 1, 2. If a consumer can cus-
tomize demand freely, demand is given by (4). If he is to choose attribute levels
within the interval [0, n¯], demand is given by (5), and Qi (p) ≥ Q¯i (p, n¯), i = 1, 2.
In the following we assume that x (n¯; θ1, p) < x (n¯; θ2, p) , ∀p, n¯ for θ1 < θ2 and
also that x (n¯; θ, p) is monotonic. HenceQ2 (p) > Q1 (p) and Q¯2 (p, n¯) > Q¯1 (p, n¯) ,
∀p, n¯. Further, Q¯i (p, n¯) is nonincreasing in p and nondecreasing in n¯, and Qi (p)
is also nonincreasing in p, i = 1, 2.
Using telephony as an example, heterogeneity in consumer demand is given
by diﬀerences in call duration and call dispersion. We deﬁne call dispersion
according to a cumulative distribution F1 (n) ≥ F2 (n) with a probability density
function fi (n), i = 1, 2.
9 Hence, we make the assumption that call dispersion is
independent of the price per call minute and that type 2 has a more dispersed
calling pattern compared to type 1. Since we are only interested in the calls made
by these two consumers, we can without loss of generality normalize the “entire
network” to 1, and say that type 2 always makes calls to the entire network
whereas type 1 has a more concentrated calling pattern.
9The distribution of n conditional on θ2 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution
of n conditional on θ1, if θ2 ≥ θ1. For notation we use fi (n) ≡ f (n; θi), Fi (n) ≡ F (n; θi)
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nn¯1 n¯2
x¯1
x¯2
x
Q1
Q2
(a) Purchase set
nn¯1 n¯2
x¯1
x¯2
x
Q1
Q2
Q′2
(b) Relinquish set
Figure 2: Rectangular purchase set (a) and the eﬀect on type 2’s purchase set of
a restriction in call dispersion (b)
Figure 2 gives an illustration in the case of a rectangular purchase set. With
a rectangular purchase set we have implicitly assumed that fi (n) is uniform on
[0, n¯i], Fi (n) = n/n¯i (n¯i = {n¯1, 1}). The height of the rectangle measures the
number of call minutes x to network node n. Type 1 makes calls to n¯1 diﬀerent
network nodes, whereas type 2 makes calls to n¯2 diﬀerent network nodes, i.e., n¯i
is a measure of call dispersion. Figure 2 above reﬂects that there is heterogeneity
in both call duration and call dispersion. If x¯1 = x¯2 all heterogeneity would be in
call dispersion, whereas n¯1 = n¯2 would describe a situation with all heterogeneity
in call duration. The shaded area Q′2 in ﬁgure 2 represents the part of type 2’s
ideal purchase set that he has to give up if he chooses a tariﬀ with a restriction
in call dispersion n¯1.
4 The model
The market is served by a monopolist and resale opportunities are absent. The
cost function is assumed to be linear, the ﬁxed cost is excluded from the measure
of proﬁt and the marginal cost is normalized to zero. On the demand side there
are only two consumers, type 1 with low willingness to pay and type 2 with high
willingness to pay. A consumer’s type is unobservable to the ﬁrm but each type’s
preferred calling pattern is known. We assume that type 2 has a more dispersed
calling pattern than type 1. The types’ call dispersion fi (n) is exogenous. The
reservation utility is assumed to be equal for the two consumers and normalized
7
to zero.
Because call dispersion is independent of the marginal price of a call minute,
we can also write consumers’ utility as a function independent of call dispersion.
We use the following utility function that is quasilinear and quadratic in x10
Ui =
{
θix− 12x2 − T if they pay T for x minutes of calling,
0 if they do not buy.
(6)
T is an increasing and continuous price schedule with a constant unit price
p = {p1, p2}. Given information about each type’s call dispersion, we derive
expected call length to a network node n as (θi − p) fi (n). Consumers’ demand
is thus given by
Qi (p) =
∫ 1
0
(θi − p) fi (n) dn = (θi − p) , (7)
Q¯i (p, n) =
∫ n
0
(θi − p) fi (n) dn = (θi − p)Fi (n) . (8)
The density function fi is positive and integrable on the support n ∈ [0, 1] with
a distribution function Fi(n) with F1(n) > F2(n), and f1F2 ≤ f2F1. Aggregate
demand for call minutes to the entire network is given by (7) and aggregate
demand for call minutes to the n most frequently called nodes is given by (8).
The latter case resembles the ﬁrst, except that n aﬀects the intercept and the
slope of the individual demand curves. However, these are perfectly (negatively)
correlated and the ﬁrm can infer about the slope when it knows the intercept
(and vice-versa).11
Consumer surplus under a two-part tariﬀ Ti = {pi, Ei} for some given n ≤ 1
is given by
CSi (pi, Ei, n) =
∫ θi
pi
(θi − p)Fi (n) dp− Ei, i = 1, 2, (9)
CS2 (p, E, n) > CS1 (p, E, n) . (10)
When both types choose consumption subject to the same tariﬀ, type 2 obtains a
larger surplus given that F1 (n) /F2 (n) ≤ θ2/θ1. Under this condition the demand
10We abstract from the fact that some consumers may have positive utility even in the case
when consumption is zero. A subscriber may want a network connection in order to receive
calls only, or to be able to make emergency calls. Our assumption in this model is that if the
expected net utility from making calls weakly exceeds a consumer’s reservation utility he will
ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to subscribe to the network. By assuming quasilinear utility we also ignore
income eﬀects.
11Laﬀont et al. (1987) solve for the optimal nonlinear price schedule when a monopolist is
uncertain about both the slopes and the intercepts of the individual demand curves it faces,
assuming a continuum of types and that the distributions of slopes and intercepts are indepen-
dent.
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curves of the two types never cross for any price. Since the demand curves are
linear and θ2 ≥ θ1, it is suﬃcient to evaluate the condition (θ2 − p)F2(n) ≥
(θ1 − p)F1(n) as p approaches zero.
When we solve the model we proceed in two steps. First, we solve for the
optimal two-part tariﬀs, T1 intended for type 1 and T2 intended for type 2, treating
n as exogenous. Next, having obtained a reduced form proﬁt as a function of n
we solve for the optimal restriction in call dispersion in the two-part tariﬀs T1
and T2.
5 Two-part tariﬀs
Given the slopes of the demand curves and asymmetric information over θ the
practice that maximizes proﬁt is to oﬀer diﬀerent two-part tariﬀs intended for
the two consumer types. We know equilibrium in this model as a solution where
p1 > 0 and p2 = c. The ﬁxed fee in type 1’s tariﬀ is chosen in such a way that he
receives his reservation utility and the ﬁxed fee in type 2’s tariﬀ is chosen such
that type 2 does not choose the tariﬀ intended for type 1. More formally, consider
the model as follows. A two-part tariﬀ is characterized by a triple {pi, Ei;ni}, pi is
the marginal price, Ei is a ﬁxed fee and ni ≤ 1 is the fraction of the network that
can be reached with the tariﬀ. When the reservation utility is normalized to zero,
it is individually rational to accept any tariﬀ {p, E;ni} that yields nonnegative
consumer surplus. The two individual rationality constraints are
CSi (pi, Ei, ni) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. (IRi)
Since CS2(.) > CS1(.), IR2 can not bind whenever IR1 is weakly met. Hence if
type 1 is served, IR1 is the only binding individual rationality constraint. The
other relevant constraints are the incentive compatibility constraints
CSi (pi, Ei, ni) ≥ CSi (pj , Ej, nj) , i, j = 1, 2, i = j. (ICi)
The incentive constraint requires that a consumer buys the bundle intended for
his type. IC1 can never bind if IC2 is weakly met. Hence, the incentive constraint
is downward binding only.12
It is never proﬁtable to restrict type 2’s demand and any restriction in call
dispersion will only occur in the tariﬀ intended for type 1. Henceforth we use the
notations n2 = 1 and n1 = n. The ﬁrm is searching for two-part tariﬀs {p1, E1, n}
and {p2, E2, 1} ≡ {p2, E2} in order to maximize proﬁt. If the restriction on n is
ﬁxed we have the following maximization problem
Π = max
p1,p2,E1,E2
{
E1 + p1 (θ1 − p1)F1 (n) + E2 + p2 (θ2 − p2)
}
(11)
12See for instance Tirole (1988) pp 153-154, and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pp 247-248.
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subject to pi ≥ 0, Ei ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2), IR1, and IC2
E1 =
∫ θ1
p1
(θ1 − p)F1 (n) dp, (12)
E2 = E1 +
∫ θ2
p2
(θ2 − p) dp−
∫ θ2
p1
(θ2 − p)F2 (n) dp. (13)
The outcome is unique with p1 ≥ p2 = 0, and E2 > E1, whenever θ2 > θ1 and
both types are served. The last term in (13) illustrates the two instruments that
can be used to reduce the information rent. The ﬁrm can increase p1 or decrease
n. If the ﬁrm chooses not to serve type 1, the unique outcome is a cost-plus-ﬁxed
fee tariﬀ, p2 = 0, and the entire consumer surplus is extracted via the ﬁxed fee.
We can now turn to the question of how severe the restriction in call dispersion
in type 1’s tariﬀ should be. As a benchmark however, we ﬁrst repeat the proﬁt
maximizing two-part tariﬀs in the single-dimensional case with n = 1.
If the ﬁrm has no ability to monitor call dispersion, or to condition a tariﬀ
on a restriction in call dispersion, Q is treated as a single dimensional good,
n1 = n2 = 1. This is the canonical model with two-types and single-dimensional
screening which is examined in, for instance, Sharkey and Sibley (1993).
Lemma 1 (Single-dimensional screening) A monopoly that is unable to ob-
serve anything but individual quantity purchases will increase the unit price in
type 1’s tariﬀ above marginal cost in order to reduce the information rent to type
2. If consumer heterogeneity is too large, the monopoly will exclude type 1 from
buying.
(i) For θ2
θ1
∈ [1, 3
2
]
the monopoly will serve both types and oﬀer two diﬀerent
two-part tariﬀs {p1, E1} and {0, E2} given by
p1 = θ2 − θ1, E1 = 12 (2θ1 − θ2)2 , E2 = 12 (2θ1 − θ2)2 + 12
(
θ22 − θ21
)
.
(ii) For θ2
θ1
> 3
2
the monopoly will exclude type 1 and oﬀer a cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee
tariﬀ {0, E2} and extract all surplus from type 2. The tariﬀ is given by
E2 =
1
2
θ22.
Lemma 1 is simple to verify by substituting for F1(n) = F2(n) = 1 in the
above maximization problem (11)–(13). The information rent to type 2 is exactly
balanced against the gain from serving type 1 when θ2/θ1 = 3/2, i.e., type 1 is
served only if θ2/θ1 ≤ 3/2 (cut-oﬀ rate).
Now we turn to the case of a wider strategy set, i.e., where the tariﬀ intended
for type 1 may have a restriction in call dispersion. Type 1 can only reach a
limited number of call termination points (a fraction n of the full network). Ac-
cording to (7) and (8) a restriction in call dispersion causes a negative horizontal
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shift in the demand curves. Type 2’s gross surplus from consuming the good is
evaluated according to type 2’s true willingness to pay, Q2(p), while he is given an
information rent as if the heterogeneity was described according to the demand
curves Q¯1(p, n) and Q¯2(p, n). A distortion in type 1’s tariﬀ makes it less tempting
for the high demand type to mimic the low demand type. Type 2 is less tempted
by type 1’s tariﬀ if he cannot reach the entire network and he is less tempted
when the unit price in type 1’ s tariﬀ is high. Although type 1 also suﬀers under
such distortions, he is not as seriously aﬀected as type 2. In both cases the means
is to restrict type 2’s consumption if he selects type 1’s tariﬀ, by way of a high
unit price or access to a smaller network (reduced opportunity set).
Lemma 2 (Two-dimensional screening) If consumers’ calling patterns are
type dependent, and can be monitored by the monopoly, a restriction on type 1’s
call dispersion serves as an alternative to a distortion in the unit price to type 1.
For a given restriction n, type 2 is oﬀered a cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee tariﬀ {0, En2 } and
type 1 is oﬀered a two-part tariﬀ {pn1 , En1 , n}, n ≤ 1
pn1 = θ2 − θ1
F1 (n)
F2 (n)
,
and where the ﬁxed fees En1 and E
n
2 are determined by (12) and (13).
Under our assumptions on F1 and F2, p
n
1 is nondecreasing in n, continuous,
and diﬀerentiable whenever pn1 > 0. Because type 2 consumers suﬀer more both
from a restriction in call dispersion and from an increase in the unit price, they
serve as alternative instruments to relax the incentive constraint. This is reﬂected
in the result that pn1 is decreased (increased) when n is decreased (increased).
On the other hand, both instruments are costly to use in the sense that type
1’s consumption is de facto restricted (whereas type 2’s consumption is restricted
only if he opts for type 1’s tariﬀ). In either case the consequence is that type
1 will make fewer calls. The ﬁrm loses income from these calls and since type 1
loses surplus on these calls he is not willing to participate unless the ﬁxed fee is
reduced. On the other hand, type 1’s tariﬀ is no longer as tempting for type 2 and
the ﬁxed fee from type 2 can be increased. The optimal trade-oﬀ in the ﬁrm’s use
of the two instruments depends on the relative eﬀect they have on the two types’
demand. From the pricing rule in Lemma 2 we see that larger heterogeneity in
call duration (θ2 is large relative to θ1) results in a larger unit price.
Assuming that both types are served we use part (i) of Lemma 2 and write
the expected proﬁt as a function of n as
Π(n) =


1
2
θ22 +
1
2
θ21
F1(n)
2
F2(n)
− F1 (n) θ1 (θ2 − θ1) if pn1 > 0,
θ21F1 (n) +
1
2
θ22 (1− F2 (n)) if pn1 = 0.
(14)
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The ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt with respect to n and the tariﬀs are determined by
Lemma 2. If the heterogeneity in quantity type is large relative to the hetero-
geneity in call dispersion, the ﬁrm will oﬀer type 1 consumers a two-part tariﬀ
with a restriction in call dispersion together with a distorted unit price. In the
opposite case the ﬁrm will oﬀer type 1 consumers ﬂat-rate pricing with restriction
in call dispersion. Whenever there is heterogeneity in the types’ calling pattern
the ﬁrm will restrict type 1’s calling.
Lemma 3 (Restriction in call dispersion) The ﬁrm separates between high
and low demand consumers by distorting type 1’s tariﬀ with respect to call dis-
persion, alone or together with a distortion in the unit price.
(i) Type 1 is oﬀered a cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee tariﬀ with a restriction in call disper-
sion n˜ ∈ (0, 1] if n˜ exists such that
F1(n˜)
F2(n˜)
≥ θ2
θ1
≥
√
2f1(n˜)
f2(n˜)
(ii) Type 1 is oﬀered a two-part tariﬀ with a unit price distortion and a restric-
tion in call dispersion nˆ ∈ (0, 1] if nˆ exists such that
θ2
θ1
≥ 1 + F1(nˆ)
F2(nˆ)
(1− 1
2
f2(nˆ)
f1(nˆ)
F1(nˆ)
F2(nˆ)
) ≥ F1(nˆ)
F2(nˆ)
The tariﬀs are subsequently determined according to Lemma 2.
The ﬁrm chooses to place a restriction in call dispersion in order to satisfy the
condition ∂Π/∂n ≤ 0. The ﬁrst inequality in part (i) of Lemma 3 states the
condition for pn1 > 0, whereas the last inequality in part (ii) of Lemma 3 states
the condition for pn1 = 0. In the latter case, the ﬁrm only has to trade-oﬀ how an
increase in n aﬀects the ﬁxed fees. Hence, if the heterogeneity in call duration
is low relative to the heterogeneity in call dispersion, type 1 is more likely to be
served with a cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee tariﬀ, i.e., when θ2/θ1 is small and/or F1/F2 is
large. Since the tariﬀ intended for type 2 has no restriction in call dispersion, the
demand curves Q¯1(p, n) and Q2(p) never cross if θ2/θ1 ≥ F1(n), which is always
met. It does not matter whether the demand curve Q¯2(p, n) crosses Q¯1(p, n) since
type 2 is not expected to make his purchases along Q¯2(p, n).
When call dispersion conditional on consumer type θ is known, we can char-
acterize the ﬁrm’s pricing policy. We do this in the following two sections. For
simplicity we assume that type 2 makes calls of equal length to all nodes, i.e.,
f2(n) is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Regarding type 1’s call dis-
persion we assume two diﬀerent cases, call dispersion is described either by the
uniform distribution or by a Beta distribution.
12
5.1 Uniform distribution
Call dispersion for type 1 is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, n¯1], and call
dispersion for type 2 is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1], 0 < n¯1 < 1.
The marginal unit price is pn1 = θ2 − θ1 1n¯1 . For pn1 > 0, the derivative of the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt with respect to n can be written as
dΠ
dn
=


− θ
2
1
2n2
if n¯1 ≤ n ≤ 1,
−θ1 (θ2 − θ1)
n¯1
+
θ21
2n¯21
if 0 < n < n¯1.
(15)
And if pn1 = 0 we have Π = E
n
1 + E
n
2 , and the derivative with respect to n is
dΠ
dn
=


−1
2
θ22 if n¯1 ≤ n ≤ 1,
1
n¯1
θ21 − 12θ22 if 0 < n < n¯1.
(16)
The proﬁt function is linear for n ∈ [0, n¯1) but the sign of the derivative is
ambiguous, for n ∈ (n¯1, 1] proﬁt decreases in n. The optimal restriction in call
dispersion will be one of the extremes n∗ = 0 or n∗ = n¯1. In the ﬁrst case type 1
is de facto excluded. Henceforth, we deﬁne a variable t ≡ θ2
θ1
. The propositions
that follow describe the monopoly’s pricing strategy.
Proposition 1 If heterogeneity in call dispersion is suﬃciently large relative to
heterogeneity in call duration, n∗ = n¯1 and type 1 is served with a cost-plus-ﬁxed-
fee tariﬀ {0, En1 , n¯1}. For t ∈ [1, 2] this occurs for n¯1 ≤ 1t , for t > 2 it occurs for
n¯1 ≤ 2t2 .
Proposition 1 shows that a restriction in call dispersion in type 1’s tariﬀ may
be suﬃcient to separate the types. Consumers with diﬀerent willingness to pay
are charged identical unit price, but type 2 pays a larger ﬁxed fee. In terms of
pricing, this looks like ﬁrst degree price discrimination. For t ≤ 3
2
, type 1 is
served with a restriction in call dispersion instead of with a distortion in the unit
price, for t > 3
2
, type 1 is served with a restriction in call dispersion instead of
being excluded.
Proposition 2 If demand side heterogeneity is more moderate and balanced, type
1 is served with a two-part tariﬀ {pn1 , En1 , n¯1}, and pn1 > 0. This occurs for
n¯1 > 0.5 and t < 2, and t such that
1
n¯1
≤ t ≤ 1 + 1
2n¯1
.
A restriction in call dispersion will always be used, either alone (pn1 = 0) or
in combination with a restriction on usage via distortionary pricing.
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Proposition 3 If heterogeneity in call duration is suﬃciently large relative to
heterogeneity in call dispersion, type 1 is excluded from making purchases. This
occurs for t >
√
2/n¯1 for n¯1 ∈ [0, 0.5), or for t > 1 + 12n¯1 for n¯1 ∈ [0.5, 1]. Type
2 is served with a cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee tariﬀ, {0, E2, 1}, which extracts the entire
social surplus. Type 1 is served in more cases relative to the single-dimensional
case.
    0
  0.2
  0.4
  0.6
  0.8
    1
    1   1.5     2     3     4
θ2
θ1
n¯1
∂Π
∂n
= 0
pn1 = 0
pn1 > 0
pn1 = 0
p
n1
>
0
pn1 = 0 Exclude
Exclude
Figure 3: Pricing policy towards type 1 depending on the heterogeneity along the
two dimensions. The larger the heterogeneity in call dispersion (low n¯1) the larger
is the possibility that type 1 is served and that he is served with an eﬃcient tariﬀ,
i.e., a cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee tariﬀ.
Although increased heterogeneity in call dispersion reduces the incentive to
exclude type 1, proposition 3 states that this incentive still exists.13 The proofs of
the propositions are given by simple calculations that are shown in the appendix.
Figure 3 illustrates the results.
The eﬀect of a reduction in call dispersion is that the ﬁrm can give informa-
tional rent to type 2 as if the types were described according to the demand curves
Q¯i (p, n¯1), but extract gross surplus from type 2 according to the demand curve
Q2 (p). Typically, the possibility of type 1 being served increases as n¯1 decreases
13Instead of saying that n∗ = 0 we could say that n∗ = 1 but let pn1 be suﬃciently high to
ensure that Q1(p1) = 0.
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because this increases the ‘observability’ of the two types. The generalization of
this is the fact that the ﬁrm is always better, or at least equally well, oﬀ with an
additional observable and instrument at hand.14
5.2 Beta distribution
The Beta-distribution allows for the possibility that the call length may vary
over n, i.e., over points of call termination. That is, call termination points are
ordered according to the most called number, the second most called number
etc. We keep the simpliﬁcation that type 2’s calling is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1] but say that type 1 has a more concentrated calling pattern by using
the Beta distribution and placing more probability weight to the left tail of the
distribution. Figure 4 illustrates this diﬀerence between the types.
f2(n)
f1(n)
n
fi(n)
1
(a) Probability density
F2(n)
F1(n)
n
Fi(n)
1
(b) Cumulative density
Figure 4: Probability distribution over n, the uniform distribution and the Beta
distribution with v = 1
The probability density function for the beta distribution is
f (n, v, w) =


nv−1 (1− n)w−1
B (v, w)
if 0 ≤ n ≤ 1
0 otherwise
(17)
14Sappington (1983) shows this in a regulation model. A regulator that is uncertain about
a multiproduct ﬁrm’s production technology achieves additional information by observing the
production level of each product. Caillaud et al. (1988) generalize the case with several observ-
able variables.
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where the shape parameters v and w are positive numbers. The denominator
B(v, w) is the Beta function. With v = 1, the shape of the distribution is
determined by w, the higher is w the larger is the mass for low n. We can
redeﬁne the distributions for type 1 by ﬁxing v to be 1 and letting w vary (w = 1
is the uniform distribution on [0, 1]). The p.d.f and the c.d.f. are deﬁned by
f1(n, w) =


w(1− n)w−1 if 0 ≤ n ≤ 1
0 otherwise
(18)
F1(n, w) =


1− (1− n)w if 0 ≤ n ≤ 1
0 otherwise
(19)
The probability density and cumulative density functions f2(n) and F2(n) are the
same as before. The ﬁrm seeks to maximize proﬁt with respect to n according to
the optimality condition in Lemma 3. The monopoly’s pricing strategy is given
in the following propositions.
Proposition 4 If heterogeneity in call dispersion is suﬃciently large relative to
the heterogeneity in call duration, both types are served with a cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee
tariﬀ {0, En1 , n∗}, n∗ ∈ [n′, n′′). This occurs for t ≤ t′ ≤ t′′. n′ and n′′ decrease
whereas t′ and t′′ increase as the heterogeneity in call dispersion increases (w
increases).
Proposition 4 is a replication of proposition 1, the larger the heterogeneity
in call dispersion, the more powerful is a restriction in call dispersion as an
instrument to separate the types. This can be utilized by the ﬁrm in two diﬀerent
ways. The ﬁrm can achieve less costly separation by decreasing n (reﬂecting that
n′′ decreases as w increases), or serve more types (reﬂecting that t′′ increases as
w increases).
Proposition 5 When the heterogeneity is more moderate and balanced, type 1
consumers are oﬀered a two-part tariﬀ {pn1 , En1 , n∗∗}, pn1 > 0, n∗∗ ∈ [0, n′). This
occurs for t′ ≤ t ≤ t′′, and w ≤ 2.
Proposition 5 is a replication of 2. When the heterogeneity in call duration
increases, it is necessary to increase the restriction in call dispersion in order to
restore incentive compatibility.
Proposition 6 If heterogeneity in call duration is suﬃciently large relative to
heterogeneity in call dispersion, type 1 is excluded from making purchases. This
occurs for t >
√
2w if w < 2 or for t > 1+ 1
2
w if w > 2. Type 1 is served in more
cases relative to the single-dimensional case. If w = 2, then t′ = t′′ = 2 and all
types that are served are served with a cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee tariﬀ.
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Finally, proposition 6 is a replication of proposition 3. The incentive to ex-
clude low demand consumers still exists when the heterogeneity in call duration
is suﬃciently large. The propositions 4, 5, and 6 are proved in the Appendix.
Figure 5 illustrates the results.
    0
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θ2
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t′ t′′
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n′′
∂Π
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E
x
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e
Figure 5: Pricing policy towards type 1, w = 1.7. The larger the heterogeneity in
call dispersion (high w) the larger is the possibility that type 1 is served and that
he is served with an eﬃcient tariﬀ, i.e., a cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee tariﬀ.
6 Concluding remarks
In the model presented in this paper, we have assumed that a monopoly ﬁrm
can use two instruments to achieve second-degree price discrimination. The ﬁrm
can introduce quantity distortions towards low demand types, according to the
well-known model with nonlinear pricing. Another instrument is to introduce a
restriction on the use of the service in such a way that high demand consumers are
punished more than low demand consumers. The ﬁrm typically ﬁnds it optimal
to combine distortions along the two dimensions. Then, type 1 consumers face
a two-part tariﬀ with a marginal price above marginal cost, together with a
restriction on usage. However, the restriction on usage allows the ﬁrm to reduce
the distortion in the pricing rule in the low-demand type’s tariﬀ. Whenever
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the monopoly ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to serve type 1 and there is observable
heterogeneity in the use of the service, it will always impose a restriction on usage
in type 1’s contract. Sometimes, imposing a restriction on usage is suﬃcient to
achieve separation. We also show that the results are qualitatively the same in
the case when calls are distributed according to the uniform distribution and the
Beta-distribution.
The theoretical model contributes to explain the practice of optional tariﬀs
such as calling circle tariﬀs, in which the restriction is really severe. However, it
should be remarked that promotion of calling circle tariﬀs might also serve as a
strategy to create lock-in eﬀects in duopolistic competition.
Further, the model suggests that it might be possible to practice a pricing
strategy closer to ﬂat rate pricing by separating consumers by other means than
price-cost distortions. Hence, the outcome would be closer to ﬁrst degree price
discrimination. Although this paper applies the model to a very simple example
within telecoms, the pricing principles derived are of general validity.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Propositions 1–3
For pn1 (n¯1) ≥ 0 the proﬁt function in (15) is increasing in n if
θ2
θ1
≤ 1 + 1
2n¯1
. (20)
For pn1 (n¯1) = 0 the proﬁt function in (16) is increasing in n if
θ2
θ1
≤
√
2
n¯1
. (21)
The unit price is positive if
θ2
θ1
≥ 1
n¯1
. (22)
Both conditions (20) and (21) deﬁne a curve that is steeper in the (θ2/θ1, n¯1)
space than does the condition pn1 = 0. Also, p
n
1 = 0 and dΠ/dn = 0 are binding
jointly for (θ2/θ1, n¯1) = (2,
1
2
).
dn¯1
d (θ2/θ1)
∣∣∣∣
pn1=0
= −n¯21 (23)
dn¯1
d (θ2/θ1)
∣∣∣∣
Πn=0
=


−2n¯21 for θ2/θ1 < 2
−
(√
2
n¯1
)
n¯21 for θ2/θ1 > 2
(24)
Proposition 1 is derived by solving for n¯1 in (22) (or (21)) respectively for t < (>
)2. Proposition 2 is simply given by (20) and (22). Proposition 3 is derived by
turning the inequality in (20) for n¯1 ∈ [0, 0.5), and by turning the inequality in
(21) for n¯1 ∈ [0.5, 1). Since limn¯1→1(1 + 12n¯1 ) = 32 , type 1 is served in more cases
relative to the single-dimensional case.
A.2 Proof of Propositions 4–6
From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 we derive the conditions pn1 = 0 and Π
′
n = 0, which
are the two curves in ﬁgure 5. The slopes of these are given by
dn
dt
∣∣∣∣
pn1=0
=
n2
nf1 − F1 ≤ 0 (25)
dn
dt
∣∣∣∣
Π′n=0
=


√
2f1
f1n
≤ 0 if pn1 = 0
2n3f 21
2f1(nf1 − F1)2 + nF 21 f1n
≤ 0 if pn1 > 0
(26)
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with notation f1n ≡ df1(n, w)/dn, f1w ≡ df1(n, w)/dw and so on.
When w increases there will be a positive shift in the curve deﬁning pn1 = 0.
dt
dw
∣∣∣∣
pn1=0
=
F1w
n
≥ 0 (27)
The shift in the curve deﬁning Π′n = 0 is negative for larger values of n and
positive for smaller values of n.
dt
dw
∣∣∣∣
Π′n=0
=


−f1w
f1n
if pn1 = 0
F1w
n
− 1
2n2
F1(2F1wf1 − f1w)
f 21
if pn1 > 0
(28)
When w increases it places more probability weight to the lower end. Hence, f1w
is positive for smaller values of n and negative for higher values of n, while f1n is
negative for all n ∈ [0, 1].
Next, we evaluate the shift along the t-axis
limn→0+
[
dt
dw
∣∣∣∣
Π′n=0
]
=


1√
2w
if pn1 = 0
1
2
if pn1 > 0
(29)
Hence, since the shift is positive along the t-axis, the shift along the n-axis must
be negative, implying that t′′ is increasing and n′′ is decreasing in w.
We can show that n′ decreases when the heterogeneity in call dispersion increases
by diﬀerentiating the condition
F1(n
′, w)
n′
=
√
2f1(n′, w) (30)
which gives us
dn′
dw
= − n
2f1w − nF1w
√
2f1
n2f1n −
√
2f1(nf1 − F1)
≤ 0 (31)
Since we have t′ = F1(n
′,w)
n′ , which is monotonic with dt
′/dn′ < 0 (by 25), t′ is
increasing in w. By inspection we can conclude that the ﬁrm oﬀers a cost-plus-
ﬁxed-fee tariﬀ for t < t′ and n > n′. This completes the proof of Propositions 4
and 5
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When w = 2 the curves are tangent at the point (t, n) = (2, 0) and t′ = t′′.
limn→0+
[
F1
n
]
= w (32)
limn→0+
[√
2f1
]
=
√
2w (33)
limn→0+
[
1 +
F1
n
(
1− 1
2
F1
f1
)]
= 1 +
1
2w
(34)
The shift in the curve deﬁning pn1 = 0 along the t-axis is given by
limn→0+
[
dt
dw
∣∣∣∣
pn1=0
]
= 1 (35)
The shift in (35) is larger than (29). Since w > 1 type 1 is for certain served
when t < 3/2. Together with the preceding statements this completes the proof
of Proposition 6.
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